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INTRODUCTION 
During the second half of the twentieth century, most countries experienced 
exceptional demographic growth, while some traditional cities underwent physical 
expansion, overflowing their historical jurisdictional boundaries. A quantitatively and 
qualitatively new urban form, the metropolis, became the locus of economic, social, 
and cultural life for over half the urban population in both developed and developing 
nations. It produced a continuous urban landscape that was socially differentiated and 
administratively fragmented. Since federal systems recognize the lower level of 
government (e.g., municipalities, counties) as the basic jurisdictional unit, various 
questions should be answered in order to determine the advantages and disadvantages 
local governments offer in terms of efficiency, flexibility, local democracy, and power 
of election: 
1) How can one respond positively to necessary intergovernmental relations (vertical 
and horizontal) in a metropolitan context? 
2) How should demographic, social, and economic differences be handled between 
local governments within a metropolitan region? 
3) How ought the necessary channels be established to enable all local stakeholders to 
participate in the local public decision-making process?  
This paper provides some preliminary answers to these questions and other 
related issues, referring when appropriate to Mexican examples, and is divided into 
eight sections in addition to this introduction. The first describes the way cities are 
classified by size and function. The second raises the question of metropolitan 
fragmentation; the third one attempts to determine what is at stake in public local 
administration and management; the next presents some ideas on local public services. 
Municipal finances issues are treated in section five and provide information on 
decentralisation tendencies and the capacity to generate local revenues. The next 
touches the idea of governance while the next to last section touches on some basic 
issues in public participation. Finally, the last one presents some conclusions. A list of 
references is included at the end. 
  
  
 1. NEW URBAN FORMS 
The period from 1950 to 1990 was characterised by population growth and a parallel 
urbanisation process by which urban areas spread out beyond the jurisdictional limits 
of original human settlements. Known as metropolitan growth –in which urban 
agglomeration involves various neighbouring administrative jurisdictions–, this process 
has marked the landscape, affected the role of local and city governments, and 
modified the territorial organisation of most countries. The economic, political, and 
social impacts of these processes have attracted considerable attention and new 
terminology has emerged and been coined to describe these urban phenomena. 
On the question of size, cities with at least a million inhabitants are referred to 
as millionaire cities, while those with over 10 million inhabitants –or simply over 8 
million, the size of London and New York in the 1950s– are conventionally classified as 
megacities. Geographically, these urban agglomerations could be described as 
metropolitan areas. A metropolitan area includes one central city and a set of political-
administrative units (municipalities) that are incorporated if the continuous urbanized 
area covers part of their territory.  
The term function refers to a metropolitan zone in which a local jurisdiction is 
included if it engages in interaction with the central city or with an area already 
considered part of the metropolis. This interaction becomes relevant when it reaches a 
conventionally defined percentage of the labour force living in the local jurisdiction and 
working in the metropolitan zone to which it is geographically linked. Thus, the region 
in which the city is located becomes a potential hinterland functionally dependent on 
the central city, and therefore any metropolitan zone demarcation is only temporarily 
valid and able to incorporate additional neighbouring jurisdictions. It is also important 
to point out that the geographical delimitation of metropolitan zones based on social, 
economic or environmental phenomena rarely coincides with the political-
administrative definition. 
According to these interaction criteria, it should be clear that even a small city 
(conventionally defined as having over 50 000 inhabitants) attracting a proportion of 
workers from a surrounding local jurisdiction can be considered a metropolitan zone 
and also –but not necessarily– a metropolitan area providing that the criteria of 
continuous urbanised area are met.4 A city region (or metropolitan region if at least two 
jurisdictions are involved) becomes a recognised functional unit if the population and 
economic activities in its hinterland, and the towns located within it, are dependent on 
the central city. Strong economic complementarities between cities will form a system 
of cities and define a functional region. 
Two or more functionally interrelated, contiguous metropolitan zones will be 
considered a megalopolis –a Greek term adapted by French geographer Jean Gottmann 
in the 1960s to describe the discontinuous urban complex on the northeastern 
seaboard of the United States (Gottmann 1995:3). The terms world city –oddly 
enough, coined by Patrick Geddes in 1915 as recognized by Peter Hall in 1966 and 
reformulated by Friedman (1986, 1996)– and global city    –used by Saskia Sassen 
(2001)– refer to urban agglomerations in which the location of transnational firms’ 
command functions and related activities play an important role in the context of the 
global economic order. The three main global cities by definition are New York, 
London, and Tokyo, but others could also be included as members of this club.  
Additionally, even smaller cities (between 10 000 and 50 000 inhabitants) can 
be jurisdictionally fragmented. In this case, the United States Office of Management 
and Budget (2000) identifies a category called micropolitan areas. Rather than going 
into further detail, it is probably more useful to insist on the complexity of the 
geographic phenomena that have a bearing on the achievement of environmental, 
economic, and administrative objectives. The demographic side is too important to be 
ignored. During the next half century, when the world’s population will reach a limit 
due to a drastic reduction in both birth and death rates –known as the demographic 
transition–, most megacities, millionaire cities, metropolitan areas, and megalopolises 
will be located in countries in the underdeveloped or developing world. Over half the 
world’s total population is expected to be concentrated in these large agglomerations. 
At the beginning of this century, 500 million people, almost one out of every ten 
inhabitants in the world, was already living in 35 megacities, 20 of which were in Asia, 
2 in Africa, 10 in America, and 3 in Europe (Figure 1).  
 The profusion of these huge urban agglomerations with a metropolitan area 
status poses a challenge to federal orders, at least in terms of adequate institutional 
arrangements (“metropolitan governance”), subsidiary functions (“who does what, 
where”), and fiscal federalism (“income autonomy/dependency of local governments 
and/or metropolitan areas”). In the last 15 to 20 years, economic (and cultural) 
globalisation, on the one hand, and the idea of place and locality, on the other, have 
triggered new urbanisation processes, and a necessary recognition of novel ways to 
administer and manage these emerging urban forms rather than simply relying on the 
original institutional design. But there seems to be “no one answer,” since variations in 
metropolitan structure and governance reflect national values and processes. 
  
2. FRAGMENTED METROPOLISES 
Most urban agglomerations comprise a vast geographic area and population, and 
are spatially dispersed but not necessarily with low densities; socially, economically, and 
politically complex and diverse; structured in densely, sometimes congested interactive 
networks involving flows of information, goods, people, values, and money; highly 
polarized, reflecting income and well-being differences; administratively and politically 
fragmented; spatially imbalanced in terms of economic and social infrastructure; 
functionally specialized in terms of local activities; and socially heterogeneous. 
Technological and economic exchanges resulting from recent transformations in 
the world economic system have triggered social and spatial trends affecting all the 
world’s urban regions. But whereas in developed countries the core concentrates business 
activities and mainly houses the poor –while the rich have settled in the outer suburbs–, in 
developing countries, a wealthy core is usually surrounded by the poor living mostly in 
illegal settlements. Under the current geographical and economic conditions, metropolitan 
regions have developed into complex territorial units. As such, they are functional units, 
while at the same time they suffer from spatial, social, and administrative fragmentation.5 
Given these salient characteristics, what criteria should be used to assess basic alternatives 
in terms of public administration responses? In theory, institutional arrangements may be 
positively evaluated both structurally and functionally if the following criteria are met or 
enhanced: 
i)       efficiency: ability to capture economies of scale and scope in 
service provision and financing;  
ii)        externalities: containment of local service spillover effects;  
iii)      redistribution: ability to achieve “distributive justice” in the 
allocation of social benefits and costs over a multiple set of 
differentiated jurisdictions;  
iv)       responsiveness: extent to which localized variations in consumer 
demand are met;  
v)        accessibility: access by users to service provision;  
vi)     accountability: degree to which decision-makers can be held 
politically responsible for the impact of their decisions. 
  
In fact, in conventional terms, policy analysis literature sees these criteria as 
efficiency and equity. But what problems are these new urbanization trends creating in 
terms of government responsibilities at the local level? Interrelated, interlinked questions 
include the following: How can problems be managed? How can metropolitan areas be 
governed? How are organized civil society and citizens responding?  
There is obviously little agreement over what the key issues are, how to proceed, 
and whether to adapt local governments to the new urban geographies summarized 
above. In general, there are two basic kinds of responses (Sharpe 1995:12-14): 1) those of 
an institutional nature, in other words, grounded on strong provisions involving ad hoc 
institutions, and 2) those involving cooperation that are the result of agreements between 
different institutions, but do not substantially modify the current model of governance.  
Institutional responses to the challenge of metropolitan government can be divided 
into two models: unitary and two-level or two-tier. A unitary government may be 
established by extending the boundary of the core city authority to cover the metropolis 
either totally or partially. International experience shows that unitary metropolitan 
government is more of an exception than a common solution. The paradigmatic example 
of this is Metro Toronto, where the creation of an authority known as the City of Toronto 
in April 1997 by the Province of Ontario abolished existing municipalities. 
Unitary governments have been severely criticized in at least three ways: 1) it has 
been argued that they are not viable for most metropolitan areas due simply to reasons of 
scale; 2) empirical evidence is cited as having failed to prove this government option to be 
less expensive (Fischler & Wolfe 2000; Stephens & Wikstrom 2000); 3) civil organizations 
consider that their rights have been violated by the disappearance of small-scale local 
government, as in Metro Toronto, where the main criticism focuses on the fact that the 
Ontario government has no legal authority to abolish local governments because it does 
not own them: these governments exist to provide local democracy for local residents 
(Boudreau 2000:174). 
The second institutional model, known as two-tier, consists of a way to enable local 
governments to coexist with metropolitan authorities. In this case, the model seeks to 
resolve the conflict between local values of identity and participation, while on the other 
hand, it attempts to solve the problems inherent in efficiency in metropolitan terms 
(Sharpe 1995:18). Examples of this system include Montreal where, in 2000, the Province 
of Quebec created the Communauté Métropolitaine de Montréal, an authority comprising 
municipalities with power over issues such as land-use planning, public transport and the 
metropolitan arterial network, economic development, and waste management planning.
  
 
 
This model is also known as supra-municipal or meso government, because it 
attempts to create an intermediate government authority between municipal and state or 
federal governments. One of the main drawbacks of this model is function distribution, 
since it implies a loss of power by local governments, from which the metropolitan 
authority usually takes away certain functions (Sharpe 1995:19).  
The cooperation model corresponds to a government with indirect legitimacy that 
relies on already elected government officials. It seldom has financial autonomy since it is 
financed by the government departments that created it and, thus, the matters over 
which it has authority are defined by agreements between the state or provincial 
government and the municipalities or, rather, between municipalities. 
On the basis of public choice models, some authors consider that competition 
between local governments backed by cooperation mechanisms may provide positive 
results, given that in most instances, big government implies monopolies that encourage 
“institutional rusting” (a term first used by Christopher Lovelock in 1994) and the 
strengthening of bureaucracies with no benefit to the population. They therefore support 
the existence of a regulatory framework that promotes and enables cooperation instead of 
inhibiting it.  
In short: in terms of efficiency, externalities, redistribution, responsiveness, 
accessibility, and accountability, the literature shows no conclusive difference between 
existing models of governance (Stephens & Wikstrom 2000; Feiock 2004).  
As a principle of local governance organisation, neither consolidation nor 
fragmentation is ideologically or politically neutral. In fact, in the American tradition, the 
idea of small autonomous local governments finds strong historical advocacy, but the 
argument in terms of the role of the State is a permanent political-philosophical debate 
between Locke –who saw the State as subservient and subordinate to individuals and a 
means for enhancing and protecting property– and Hobbes –for whom the State was 
designed to protect man from himself and his neighbours and thus had few limits. In 
between there are various alternative models for governance. In the context of 
metropolitan regions, the tendency is to respond to physical expansion, urban 
development, and service needs beyond municipal boundaries. And while one position 
favours the creation of larger government units and service districts covering the 
metropolitan area, the other prefers to retain smaller units for both government and 
servicing. 
In both cases, international experience shows that metropolitan functions comprise 
strategic planning, arterial roads, public transport, regional public buildings, water supply 
and sanitation, solid waste management, police, and environmental protection. 
The case of São Paulo, Brazil, with 18 million inhabitants and 39 municipalities, 
is a good but limited example of effective metropolitan government where the very 
different local authorities act collectively in a coordinated fashion. One such authority 
is the Câmara Regional do Grande ABC covering an area with a strong political identity 
and over two million people. Although this is only a limited initiative to create a sort of 
sub-regional government aimed at improving economic conditions in the area, its 
success is also limited due to problems involving duplication of efforts and lack of 
coordination and financial resources, weak administrative and technical knowledge 
and, most importantly, the absence of an institutional framework, which makes the 
whole experience dependent on the political will of local authorities to implement 
policy decisions.  
Mexico’s capital city is yet another example. It is the second largest city in the 
world (after Japan’s Tokyo-Yokohama Megalopolis), with a population of over 18 
million in 2000. As a functional geographical unit, the metropolitan area includes the 
Federal District (DF, Distrito Federal), subdivided into 16 delegaciones or local 
jurisdictions functioning as an equivalent to local authorities, and as many as 58 
municipalities in the neighbouring State of México and one in the State of Hidalgo. In 
addition to its government authorities, the DF, which contained the built-up area of 
Mexico City until the 1950s, houses the federal government powers (including all 
ministries and the other branches of the Executive). The head office of the DF, 
administered as a federal government agency until 1997, is now directly elected, and 
has a similar status to a state governor. 
Already a metropolitan area in the 1970s, it reached mega city status when the 
outer sprawl intensified in the 1980s. Millions of daily commuters flooded the city’s 
transportation network, travelling long distances and, what was even worse, spending 
hours getting to their jobs, now scattered over a vast megalopolitan region. In fact, the 
national capital became a complex regional megalopolis when, in the late 1990s, the 
Mexico City Metropolitan Area (MCMA) reached the metropolitan area of Toluca (the 
State of México’s capital city), over 60 km (40 miles) west of the city centre. 
  Given these trends in this and, to a certain extent, other cities throughout 
Mexico, the federal government responded in the 1970s by creating commissions to 
control urban growth and for other necessary administrative coordination at the 
interstate level. The activities of the Commission for Conurbation in the Central Region 
of Mexico (focusing largely on the MCMA) virtually ceased in the 1980s, after having 
achieved limited results. It was replaced in the mid-1990s by sector-specific 
metropolitan commissions for human settlements, environment, public safety, waste 
disposal, water and sanitation, transport and roads, and civil protection. The DF and 
the State of México signed an agreement with the federal government. In 1998, a 
bilateral agreement to create the Executive Commission for Metropolitan Coordination 
was signed between the DF and the State of México as a more comprehensive 
framework for coordinating, evaluating, and monitoring plans, programs, and actions 
within the metropolitan territory of the Valley of Mexico. All these experiences failed 
to achieve significant results, due largely to their voluntary nature, since none of the 
signatories is obliged to fulfil its commitments.  
These efforts are obviously not unique. Many examples around the world 
combining different models (consolidated unitary metropolitan government or 
fragmented with voluntary or induced cooperation and associational schemes) are 
successfully in place in an effort to manage metropolitan functions and growth. A 
parallel evolution for the two largest metropolitan areas in Mexico (the GMA, or 
Guadalajara Metropolitan Area, and the MCMA, or Mexico City Metropolitan Area) is 
synthesized in Figure 2. 
Within the context of a federal system, the administration and management of 
metropolitan regions begs for strong intergovernmental relations (IGR), horizontally 
between government entities at the same territorial level and vertically between 
national, state, and municipal orders. This need for coordinated public policies must be 
met within a largely federal system in which local governments are free and sovereign 
by law, since they are entitled to draw up their own legal system provided it does not 
contradict the federal one. Even if the federal system’s characteristics guarantee 
autonomy, relationships between government spheres may occur in three different 
forms (Stromme 1999:13-17), namely: dual federalism, based on the division of 
power, authority, and function between the various government spheres, considering 
that power is autonomy and that responsibilities are separate, thereby eliminating the 
possibility of overlap; functional federalism, which considers that power relations 
between different levels must take place in a hierarchical form and that responsibilities 
should be organized according to their specialty or sector; and multi-centred 
federalism, which implies that public issues must be addressed through a mix of 
complex attributions in keeping with reality. Responsibilities are contemplated as 
something shared, where decision-making must take place through dynamic processes. 
 
 
 
 
3. LOCAL ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT 
In the context of the “reinventing government” movement, the study of administration, 
management, and public policy became either fragmented and/or neglected; given the 
growing social complexity, it no longer had the impact on decisions that had prompted the 
development first of public administration and subsequently of public management. There was 
awareness that local government could do its share, but without effective partnerships, it 
would not be able to achieve the results being sought; close, active partnerships with 
nongovernmental parties would be required to achieve its aims. But why is it in local 
authorities’ interests to do just that? 
Local authorities’ main purpose is to improve social well-being by supplying public 
goods and services, but also to create conditions for economic development. So in referring to 
fragmented metropolitan structures, we are essentially thinking in terms of the geography 
(the influence of space and location) of local administration and, specifically, three essential 
issues: 1) size and shape of the administrative areas used in the delivery of public services; 2) 
interactions between the areas; 3) the spatial allocation of public services among and within 
areas. The first two necessarily refer to IGR. The third includes the additional problem of 
location-allocation models: the determination of optimal locations of central facilities in order 
to minimize movement and other costs (Johnston et al. 2000:467).  
There is a valid distinction between public administration –as related to establishing 
hierarchy and authority boundaries– and public management –promoting and limiting the 
exercise of governmental power and coordinating different agencies (and agents) and 
programs in service integration. In this sense, public administration is also about managing –
both promoting and limiting– the exercise of governmental power, in other words, the “what” 
and “how” and, no less importantly, the “who” and “where,” as will be clear from the next two 
sections. 
The preceding concepts (Kettl 2002:21) are certainly relevant to analyzing a 
metropolitan region. An internal system of subdivisions and an associated distribution of 
administrative functions –not only at the national level– concerns emotional and political links 
between peoples and places (Muir 1997:146-147). In a context of ethnic and cultural diversity, 
in a highly heterogeneous metropolitan region characterized by cultural, political, and 
ideological, as well as socio-economic and demographic, not to mention geographic and 
ecological differences, the goal of federalism –i.e., the development of institutions that balance 
centrifugal and centripetal forces within the State– is evinced. As Padisson (1983, cited in Muir 
1997:152) questioned: How can one assemble the separate and diverse areas and interests 
into an effective whole?6  
  
 
4. LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS AND SERVICES 
In a metropolitan context, local authorities face various challenges when attempting to 
deliver public goods and services. By definition, “pure” public goods, regardless of 
whether they are produced by public entities or by private contractors, are non-
divisible, non-rejectable, and non-excludable. But there are very few in this category 
due to the difficulties of ensuring equal provision. Most public goods and services are 
“impure” since they are provided locally at fixed locations or along established routes in 
which provision declines as distance increases, meaning that they are related to 
accessibility and, therefore, that location becomes an issue. Aside from location, 
another “impurity” relates to density of provision. Local governments usually supply 
these services and provision differs as regards to how much is spent on a service. 
Moreover, the scale required to achieve viability in providing a service affects the 
decision as to whether or not a service is offered by a local government. 
Geography (space) matters in terms of access to public goods 
and services, due to: 
i)     Jurisdictional or territorial fragmentation (including, 
among other aspects, economies of scale in the 
production of public goods and services), i.e., 
consequent inequalities or “tapering effects” 
(“distance-decay effects”) in service provision levels 
between these areas;7  
ii)     Fixed location of certain public services; 
iii)     Externalities (negative or positive) generated by the 
presence of a service in a fixed location (parks, 
hospitals, libraries, highways, etc.) or in terms of 
differences in service provision between areas due to 
historical, political or organizational factors, imposed 
upon them by desirable or undesirable aspects of 
service infrastructure, since locating services has an as 
yet unproven impact on other neighbourhood areas. 
  
Coordination problems must be solved, so IGR based on trust between 
municipalities (regardless of whether they are contiguous), between state and 
municipalities, and between the latter and federal government are essential for 
efficiency, equity, and distributive justice.8 This means that no matter what area 
people live in, a fair territorial income distribution would be secured to meet local 
needs. This, of course, poses the problem of minorities and special merit cases, another 
argument in favour of local differentiation. In some cases, especially those associated 
with welfare policies, states rather than municipalities are the best units of 
government for internalizing spillovers. These might be cost-side spillovers, when 
significant mobility of lower-income families occurs between cities and within 
metropolitan regions, or benefit-side spillovers, where there are possibilities that the 
population in neighbouring areas will benefit from measures aimed at groups in 
adjacent municipalities (Inman & Rubinfeld 1997:59). 
Efficiency problems in the provision of public goods and services at the local 
level are related to: a) duplication of public services and urban infrastructure when 
each municipal authority trying to fulfill its responsibilities feels compelled to provide 
all possible services, albeit in an inefficient or partial manner; b) the fact that, in order 
to be efficiently produced, some of these services will have to reach a certain scale to 
be economically viable, meaning that some municipalities will be at a disadvantage due 
to their population size; and c) cases in which, due to excess demand for a public 
service by the neighbouring population, neither they nor the consumers to whom the 
service is offered will benefit, since quality and quantity levels are affected by demand 
pressures, not taken into account originally. 
Problems of equity are inevitably related to financial matters, since quality levels 
of public services vary between jurisdictions. Thus, needs remain unmet, since the tax 
base of a poor municipality is not large enough to secure the provision of the service at 
the level and of the quality expected. 
Lastly, it is not possible “to do the job” even with enough resources when there 
is a lack of coordination within local government or between local authorities. The 
provision of certain public services –as mentioned above– requires a degree of 
coordination, if not a formal body. Are environmental control, metropolitan 
transportation, and solid waste management to be regulated at an intergovernmental 
level by a metropolitan governmental entity or by an ad hoc commission? That is a 
major question. But all these problems will not be properly tackled if local authorities 
are unable to increase their material, financial, and human resources. 
 
 
 
 
  
5. FISCAL FEDERALISM AND MUNICIPAL FINANCES  
The link between sub-national inequalities and fiscal federalism is significant. A good 
example is Mexico, a country with enormous regional disparities (Graizbord & Aguilar 
2006). In 2000, its central and northern states enjoyed twice the per capita income of 
the southern states. The most dramatic difference was between the Federal District 
per capita income and that of the remaining states, which was 1.4 times that of Nuevo 
León, the second richest in the country, and six times that of Chiapas, the poorest. This 
tendency seems to have been on the rise since the 1980s, as empirical evidence from 
various studies shows (Barriga & Vázquez 2006:834).  
In Mexico, approximately 50 per cent of regular federal income is transferred to 
the states every year, accounting for approximately 85 per cent of their total annual 
income. This is equally true for the municipalities. For some poor rural municipalities, 
federal transfers and subsidies (called participaciones federales) constitute over 80 per 
cent of their income, while the total federal funds transferred to municipal units 
represent no more than 6 per cent of annual federal tax revenues. 
It is important to recognize, however, that national programs such as 
Solidaridad (PRONASOL), launched by the Salinas Administration in 1988, and more 
recently Oportunidades, an offspring of the Fox Administration (2000-2006), as well as 
efforts towards transparency and accountability –insisted upon by the present federal 
administration (2007-2012) headed by Felipe Calderón– have been instrumental in 
supporting an increase in the total income being targeted to, but also being collected 
by local authorities. 
In some cases, urban municipalities have been able to break away from this 
dependent situation, either by increasing local property taxes, improving tax 
collection, or raising public utilities charges, mainly for water and sanitation (Sour 
2004:746). In fact, paradoxically, federal transfers have discouraged urban 
municipalities from augmenting their local revenues, particularly in Mexico City’s larger 
metropolitan municipalities. 
In general, the system has encouraged biased results favouring states rather 
than municipalities. Furthermore, while reducing the proportion of total allocations 
targeted to the Federal District from 23.4 per cent in 1980 to 12 per cent in 2000, it 
only favoured states with consolidated urban markets as opposed to those with a 
predominantly agricultural economic base (Ortega 1994:85). It is therefore reasonable 
to conclude that this fiscal instrument, while responding to decentralisation principles, 
failed to reduce regional inequalities over the past two decades at the same time as the 
resources directed to and generated by local authorities experienced a real increase. In 
fact, during the period from 1998 to 2009, total municipal income increased more 
rapidly than that of the Federal District, which until 1997 had been exactly the same as 
that of all municipalities. On the other hand, the municipalities’ total income grew in 
absolute terms, at the expense –in relative terms– of the Federal District’s, and despite 
the slow growth of the country’s GDP (Figure 3). 
Decentralisation efforts, however, have greatly increased the proportion of 
local governments’ revenues in relation to the country’s GDP (from 0.22 percentage 
points in 1989 to 4.34 in 2009) and, at the same time, have shifted the balance 
between the Federal District and the rest of the municipalities, from 0.11/0.11 in 1989 
to 1.42/2.91 in 2009, respectively (Figure 4). 
Whereas it is true that expenditure on public services which maintain and 
enhance the city are largely the responsibility of local governments, the nature and 
scope of local government functions depends not only on the size of their population 
but also on the degree of autonomy they enjoy in the political system. In fact, the 
weight of federal allocations is such that local authorities are subject to state and 
federal government priorities, while at the same time, state and federal executive 
branches may exercise their discretionary powers to allot funds as well as investments 
to certain municipalities (Rodríguez 1999:255).  
A different picture emerges when local authorities are able to generate direct 
revenues within their jurisdiction. In a comprehensive study examining governance 
issues in metropolitan areas in the United States, a two-dimensional scale to identify 
competitive positions of municipalities in metropolitan regions was proposed. On one 
axis, it measured the way a citizen as a “voter” would see the rate of taxation affecting 
him/her and, on the other, the appreciation he/she might have as a “consumer” of the 
resources available. The case of low taxes and high available resources was regarded as 
ideal, while the opposite was considered undesirable, but the other two possible cases 
in this model seemed paradigmatic and could therefore be applied to other contexts. 
Taxation rates, together with public service availability and provision, are highly 
differentiated in the metropolitan context. Some municipalities are characterized by 
low and others by high taxation, and some by low and others by high availability of 
resources, and could therefore be attractive to certain citizens and trigger a process of 
metropolitan residential mobility where family units “vote with their feet.” Local 
governments that are well placed on both axes change for the better more quickly 
than those that are under more pressure to increase their revenue via property taxes. 
This fact enables these municipalities to address their citizens’ preferences in non-care 
services, i.e., goods and services that would enhance their “quality of life” without 
having to increase administrative overheads and the provision of basic services.  
When evaluating local government performance as building blocks of a 
metropolitan region, the set of standards exemplified in the previous description would 
therefore include not only the efficient delivery of public services but, more 
importantly, the creation of a competitive region to attract human and economic 
capital. This is an effort that the present government of the Federal District is still 
engaged in, albeit incipiently. 
 
6. GOVERNANCE 
Governance has been a catchword in political theory and political science since the 1990s, and 
should also be so in public administration. It has become a central issue in the face of the 
salient complexities metropolitan areas bring to “the act or process of government.” Some of 
these outstanding features have already been mentioned: metropolitan regions include vast 
geographical areas and population in a pattern of dispersed but not necessarily low-density 
expansion; they are massively complex with strong, dense networks of interaction, socially 
diverse, and economically polarized, with increased sub-area specialization; and they evidence 
great political fragmentation and increasing imbalances in infrastructure and social services 
affecting heterogeneous neighbourhoods, ethnic diversity, specialized commercial clusters, 
and diverse activity complexes.  
Thus, governance is a way of describing the political, social, and administrative links 
between government and this broader environment (Kettl 2002:21-24), as well as the 
initiatives that governments deploy to shrink their size while at the same time meeting 
citizens’ demands. Whereas “government” is the portion of the activity that acts with 
authority and creates formal obligations, “governance” relates to the process and institutions 
through which social actions occur, which might or might not be governmental. 
Two broad uses of the term can be distinguished (Johnston et al. 2000:317). 
Governance is related to: 
i) The nature of an organization; 
ii) The nature of the relationships between organizations. 
  
In the first sense, governance is a broader category than government; it questions the 
nature of the system, while acknowledging the difficulty of making the coordination of social 
complexities and the steering of societal development the sole responsibility of the State. In 
the second sense, it entails particular forms of coordination. In contrast to top-down control, it 
involves networks and partnerships. According to Rhodes (1997, cited in Johnston et al. 
2000:317), four significant features are considered: 
1)     Interdependence between organizations covering state and non-state 
actors in a context of shifting and opaque boundaries; 
2)     Continuing interactions between network members, since there is a 
need to exchange resources and negotiate objectives; 
3)     Game-like interactions based on trust and regulated by rules agreed 
upon by network participants; 
4)     A significant degree of autonomy from the State, which does not 
occupy a sovereign position, but rather steers or directs networks 
indirectly and imperfectly. 
  
In this context, there are a number of alternative models for the governance of 
metropolitan regions. One model, of course, involves doing nothing, while the other entails 
privatizing all or certain functions that cross local jurisdictions. In between, there are instances 
of centralization efforts and of maintaining the decentralized pattern of multiple local 
authorities.  
This broad spectrum includes:  
1)     Centralization of power and administrative functions (service delivery) 
2)     Annexation of new or already built-up areas 
3)     Amalgamation or merger of city and suburbs, two or more adjacent 
cities, or city and county 
4)     Creation of regional authorities, either a single multifunctional one or 
several special- purpose agencies 
5)     Establishment of a formal, two-tier government structure with 
appointed or elected officials 
6)     Partnerships or associations (either voluntary or promoted, and ad hoc 
or permanent) between or among local authorities, between local and 
state governments, and between local authorities and private agencies. 
  
The latter two appear to favour retaining smaller units for both government and 
servicing, while the first four support the creation of larger government units and service 
districts at the metropolitan level. 
  
 
 
 
7. REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATORY CITIZENSHIP 
An additional ingredient for metropolitan governance and democracy is active civic 
participation. Political representation and civic participation are two conditions of 
governance at both the local and metropolitan level. They are related to political equality 
and institutional development based on recognized democratic principles such as:  
§     Free, fair, and frequent elections 
§     Freedom of expression 
§     Free access by citizens to views other than those of officials 
(alternative sources of information) and 
§     Full freedom for political organizations to form and engage in 
political activity. 
  
In this context, the two basic conditions/expressions of the relationship between 
those governing and those governed require due clarification. 
Political representation. The degree to which civil society in general and 
neighbourhood organisations in particular are represented in city governments and 
bureaucracies, as well as how they are perceived and their demands considered by key 
decision-makers, are undoubtedly crucial in explaining different institutional arrangements 
and outcomes (Burnett 1984:339). This is necessarily an empirical question and begs for 
specific local studies, in which citizens’ and social groups’ practices could be effectively 
addressed. It is important to understand the need for political representation at both 
levels: local and metropolitan, although this is a less common concern in the latter. 
Citizens’ participation. In the context of a metropolitan region in which municipalities 
and states are governed by different political parties, the way neighbourhood 
organisations and their political participation in general are accepted will vary according to 
the ideological principles of local governance. But the possibilities of engaging in the 
planning process will also be different vis-à-vis how authorities, regardless of the party 
they belong to, understand the process and are open to innovative urban practices 
(Graizbord 1999; De la Peña 1998). Unfortunately, in some cases, the public-private divide 
is being understood more in terms of regulation, while the role of the community as a 
participant in the provision of services (especially in health care and education, but also in 
housing) is becoming less and less important. These trends should be kept in mind as a 
premise when analyzing metropolitan regions and the possibilities of coordination and 
cooperation between the various actors or stakeholders present, with different roles, at 
the neighbourhood, municipality, and metropolitan level. 
   
8. CONCLUSIONS 
The metropolitan administrative model and governance are controversial issues lacking consensus 
with regard to the best solutions, whether theoretical or empirical. Among the reasons underlying 
this, one should emphasize the fact that any metropolitan response implies a redistribution of 
public power, which generates resistance between different actors in the public sphere (Pérez-
Torres 2002:63; Feiock 2004:4). 
An additional obstacle lies in the attributes that characterize municipalities in developing 
countries. In the case of Mexico, for example, other functions related to the population’s well-being 
are not necessarily the responsibility of the municipality despite the fact that those governing cities 
find it necessary to respond to the population’s demand for services in the realms of education, 
health, housing, culture, and recreation and, to an increasing degree, environment-related issues. 
Town councils see themselves even less as playing a role in aspects associated with development. In 
particular, during the second half of the twentieth century, in municipalities in which urban growth 
–which has characterized large and middle-sized cities– has been a dominant factor, it is 
considered to be important to address the problems of social and economic development produced 
by metropolitan dynamics. Yet even so, there are structural conditions hindering the development 
of municipal administrations and limiting institutional, as well as political, economic, and social 
consolidation (Cabrero & Gil 2010:165-166). 
Cabrero and Gil (2010) have presented a description of the historical evolution of 
management of municipalities in the case of one containing a middle-sized city (metropolis) in this 
country (San Luis Potosí) by means of analyzing the proceedings of town council meetings 
throughout the entire twentieth century. To facilitate their review, they classified them according 
to the issues addressed in the following agendas: municipal services, non-municipal services, 
municipal development, as well as the administrative, political, and legal agendas. We draw from 
their comments on this question for the purpose of highlighting the checks and limitations 
confronted by municipalities seeking to widen their strategic vision. Among the most conspicuous 
of these obstacles, they mention the following: rigidity and obsolescence of municipalities’ 
institutional design, particularly urban ones; the fact that town councils continue to use traditional 
decision-making patterns which, as regards their mechanics, reflect “the limited ability for 
organising, preparing, and analysing the matters to be dealt with [which] subjects urban 
municipalities to structural weaknesses that keep them from tackling the problem of urban 
development in a professional, rigorous manner” and other “factors such as the intense turnover of 
middle- and high-level officials in municipal administrations, the prevailing party-centred logic of 
town council members, and the lack of appropriate mechanisms for ensuring intergovernmental 
and metropolitan cooperation…” (Cabrero & Gil 2010:144-146). 
Moreover, we should mention the short period of just three years during which a municipal 
government is in office and the limited tax base of the majority of municipalities, which confines 
their own revenues through local tax collection. The problem is that, within the context 
surrounding urban growth and development in Mexico –with nearly 60 metropolises, close to 400 
metropolitan municipalities, and at least 50 per cent of the country’s total population concentrated 
in those municipalities–, there is an urgent need for a complete transition in terms of management 
and governance or, in other words, institutional development enabling them to meet expectations 
for economic and social well-being which are being achieved by cities in other parts of the world 
(Berry 2007; Pacione 2009). 
Finally, another major hindrance to the creation of metropolitan governance models in 
federal countries involves the pre-existence of a political and administrative structure that was 
designed at a time when the metropolitan phenomenon was absent (Pérez-Torres 2002:52). New 
circumstances resulting from urban sprawl cast doubt on the former paradigm that failed to 
provide answers, which rather must be sought within the specific context of the metropolis. This 
goal needs to take into account the tension between metropolitan and local scales, now that the 
accepted and most influential trend is to empower local governance. Although a metropolitan 
reform requires the presence of strong local governments, the challenge lies in striking a balance 
between metropolitan agreements and meeting the needs of the local electorate. This may be 
achieved together with greater facilities for inter-governmental partnerships at all levels through a 
type of multi-centred federalism that improves local democracy and governance while, at the same 
time, ensures that broader agreements are built and materialized on the metropolitan scale. 
Traditional paradigms of government and governance are insufficient for dealing with the 
problems of a qualitatively different kind of city such as the metropolis within a context of federal 
systems (with sometimes drastic differences between developed and developing nations) because 
its organizational principles limit the possibilities of institutional answers in the form of ad hoc 
governments, leaving solutions mostly to voluntary and casuistic agreements among neighbouring 
municipalities or between the various levels of government, especially when two or more federal 
entities are involved, as in the case of the Mexico City Metropolitan Area. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 An original version was prepared by request as Graizbord, Boris (2007) Governance of 
megacities in federal orders. Background reading for work sessions 12 & 24, Conference 
Reader: “Unity in Diversity –Learning from Each Other,” Fourth International Conference on 
Federalism, 5-7 November, New Delhi, India, pp. 467-496. The authors of the current 
manuscript thank Susan Beth Kapilian (subeka2000@yahoo.com) for her careful editorial 
revision. 
 
2 Professor-researcher at the Center for Demographic, Urban, and Environmental Studies and 
Coordinator of LEAD-Mexico, El Colegio de México, Mexico City (graizbord@lead.colmex.mx). 
 
3 Doctoral student in urbanism at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (National 
Autonomous University of Mexico), Mexico City (dpereztorr@gmail.com). 
 
4 In the case of Mexico, official figures published in INEGI, CONAPO, & SEDESOL (National 
Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Informatics; National Population Council; and Ministry of 
Social Development, respectively) (2007) have defined 56 metropolitan areas that include a 
total of 345 municipalities. In 2005, total metropolitan residents amounted to close to 58 
million, representing 56 per cent of the country’s population and 78.6 per cent of its urban 
inhabitants. 
 
5 The Mexico City Metropolitan Area is a clear example in terms of administrative, political, and 
social fragmentation. Its functional area covers at least 3 federal entities (the Federal District, 
the State of México, and the State of Hidalgo). The periphery combines vast low-income 
segments of the population that reside in lower-level housing complexes that are consolidated 
or were recently built by either the government or private developers. It also includes irregular 
settlements with mixed high-income residential developments. 
 
6 Examples of confrontation are the “Vive le Québec Libre” movement in Canada based on 
religious and fundamentalist identities, and the Atenco movement in Mexico that recently 
united a whole community defending their land which successfully confronted the Mexico City 
government because the latter had attempted to expropriate it to build a new airport for the 
city. 
 
7 See Pinch (1985:84-89) for a clear presentation of the concept of “distance-decay” and the 
friction of distance and how these affect locational efficiency or accessibility to local public 
services. 
  
8 For an influential treatment of geographic social justice, see Harvey (1973). A just territorial 
distribution of income –he argued– would be such that meets the needs of people no matter 
which area they live in, which introduces the question of “people” or “place” to be considered 
in urban social policies. 
 
 
